



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## Notes

[Contributions in the form of notes or discussions should be sent to John A. Scott, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.]

### A POINT IN THE ARGUMENT OF PLATO'S *APOLOGY* (32a)

A better case of Socratic irony can hardly be found than in the exordium of the *Apology*, where Socrates tells the judges that he will speak at random (17c) and that he is unfamiliar with forensic oratory (17d). Professor R. J. Bonner has shown (*Classical Philology*, III, 169-77) how closely the *Apology* conforms, albeit unostentatiously, to the requirements of Athenian legal procedure, and it is recognized that the arguments in their general arrangement are far from being *εἰκῇ λεγόμενα*. The present note deals with a point which is vital to the argument of the *digressio* (28a-34b).

This division of the *Apology*, which contains some of the noblest passages in all literature, takes the form of a rebuttal of possible objections, and at first glance seems to be a rather general vindication of Socrates' peculiar manner of life. But on closer examination it is seen that in spite of the apparent digressions Socrates is confining himself to the specific charge of atheism (as Meletus has interpreted the indictment) and of corrupting the youth. This is intimated toward the close of his answer to the first objection (29b): τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν οἶδα, κτλ. The bearing of his fear of doing wrong upon the charge of corrupting the youth Socrates reserves for later discussion, as we shall see, and proceeds to explain how, as the apostle of ethical idealism, he has been obeying the command of God—which implies belief in the gods, as he has already stated (29a). This leads him to touch upon the charge that he had introduced strange *δαιμόνια*, for the natural objection might be made to his claim to a divine mission that if God had commanded him to be a "gadfly" he ought to have taken part in legislative debates (31c). It was difficult to answer this objection convincingly to an Athenian jury, and so he presents "strong evidence," which he calls "tiresome court-commonplaces," because of the reference to his public services (32a). Apparently he has in mind to prove nothing more than that his *δαιμόνιον* must have been a "voice from heaven," because its warning not to enter public life was proved by experience to have been justified. But the words, ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικαθήσοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον (32a), introduce another consideration—in fact, they prepare the way for bringing back the argument to the charge of corrupting the youth, which is taken up at 33a. The key to the sudden shift in the argument is found in the use of οὐδ' ἐνὶ instead of οὐδέν ("yield to no one," instead of "yield no point"). This is clear when

we compare 33*a*, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἰ ποῦ τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτ' ἄλλῃ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ οὗς οἱ διαβάλλοντές μέ φασιν ἐμὸν μαθητὰς εἶναι. Socrates cannot prove that no young man who has been with him has been corrupted. His challenge to the prosecution to put on the witness stand the fathers or brothers who are present is, of course, helpful in establishing his innocence. But the jury must have felt that the careers of Critias and Alcibiades outweighed all the others. Socrates cannot directly clear himself of the charge that he was somewhat responsible for the harm which these two former "pupils" of his had done Athens. His argument that he neither promised nor gave instruction to anyone (33*b*) is not convincing. But evidence which tended to prove that he never made a wrong concession to anyone, even at the risk of his life, has greater weight. That Socrates actually had Critias and Alcibiades in mind when he used οὐδ' ἐνὶ in 32*a* seems more probable when we compare 32*c*, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν [the trial of the generals] ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, κτλ., with Xen. *Mem.*, i. 2. 12, "ἀλλ'," ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος [who was doubtless giving expression to what at the time of the trial had been the common opinion], "Σωκράτει ὁμολητὰ γεγονένω Κριτίας καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποίησάτην" Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων κλέπτιστός τε καὶ βιαιότατος καὶ φονικώτατος ἐγένετο, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρατέστατός τε καὶ ὑβριστικώτατος καὶ βιαιότατος.

SAMUEL E. BASSETT

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT  
BURLINGTON

#### XENOPHON *Anabasis* i. 5. 9

This passage is given in Marchant's Oxford text as follows: καὶ συνιδεῖν δ' ἦν τῷ προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν τῇ βασιλείᾳ ἀρχῇ πλήθει μὲν χώρας καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, τοῖς δὲ μήκεσι τῶν ὁδῶν καὶ τῷ διεσπᾶσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις ἀσθενής, εἴ τις διὰ ταχέων τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖτο. No passage in the *Anabasis* causes the beginner more trouble than this, and the recent American editors all merely increase the difficulty by wrongly interpreting the construction. The annotators, at least from Goodwin and White down, assume that συνιδεῖν stands in the completed sentence as the subject of the verb ἦν. Either by implication or by direct assertion the student is led to assign the meaning of possibility to the verb ἦν. Naturally enough, the student finds it difficult to understand why the direct object of the verb should stand in the nominative case (ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα). The editors lead him to think that such is the construction here, and add by way of explanation that the nominative is used because the writer's point of view shifts and he then has in mind some such phrase as δόλην ἦν, which would require the nominative. "Possibly Xenophon was interrupted in the middle of the sentence, and when he wrote ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα